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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2013 Emily Zackin published Looking for Rights in All the Wrong 
Places, a book detailing the development of positive-rights guarantees in state 
constitutions.2 Had she not done so, I might have been tempted to entitle this 
Article Looking for Popular Constitutionalism in All the Wrong Places. The 
literature on popular constitutionalism has focused exclusively on the federal 
Constitution and has found, perhaps unsurprisingly, relatively few episodes of 
popular constitutionalism, particularly in recent years.3 Proponents of popular 
constitutionalism have been forced to conflate it with departmentalism in order 
to be able to suggest its relevance in the present day.4 Yet if one turns one’s 
attention to the American states, a very different picture emerges. As this 
Article demonstrates, popular constitutionalism has flourished in the states, 
with popular conventions creating new constitutions and revising old ones, 
particularly in the nineteenth century, and with the people in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries ratifying (and in states with the constitutional initiative, 
proposing as well) myriad changes, both major and minor, to state 
constitutions. Whereas popular constitutionalism at the federal level has been 
episodic, involving popular movements acting outside the normal political 
channels, the states have institutionalized popular constitutionalism, providing 
regular opportunities for popular influence on the substance and interpretation 
of state constitutions; and majorities within the states have proved willing, 
even eager, to avail themselves of those opportunities.5 
This Article looks first at popular constitutionalism at the federal level, 
considering both the limited opportunities for popular input via the Article V 
amendment procedures and the similarly limited opportunities outside those 
procedures. It then turns to the opportunities available to state publics under 
their state constitutions, noting the myriad constitutionally prescribed 
opportunities for popular constitutionalism and in the effect of those 
opportunities in discouraging the use of extraconstitutional mechanisms for 
popular input. It concludes by considering the implications of the dual state 
and federal constitutional traditions for thinking about the role that the people 
play—and should play—in American constitutionalism. 
II. THE POPULAR ROLE IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The creation of constitutions and—where necessary—their revision 
(replacement) or amendment are among the most fundamental tasks that a 
                                                                                                                     
 2 See generally EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: 
WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS (2013). 
 3 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS].  
 4 Larry Kramer, Response, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1173, 1182 (2006) [hereinafter 
Kramer, Response]. 
 5 See infra notes 57–68 and accompanying text.  
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political society can undertake. From the very outset, it was understood that it 
was the people who should undertake these tasks of constitutional creation, 
revision, and amendment. The right of the people to create and revise their 
systems of government was recognized in the Declaration of Independence, 
enshrined in state constitutions, and endorsed by political figures from across 
the political spectrum. James Madison, though hardly a proponent of frequent 
recurrence to the people on constitutional matters, proposed that the right of 
the people to create and re-create their fundamental law be enshrined in the 
federal Constitution; and although this provision was dropped by the House 
committee that reviewed his proposed Bill of Rights, the change did not signal 
disagreement about the people’s right to make and unmake constitutions.6 
What does this right entail? It means, at a minimum, that the people have the 
power to decide whether or not to create or revise a constitution; that they 
should determine its contents or choose those who engage in drafting the 
constitution; and that they should vote, again either directly or indirectly, on 
whether to adopt what the drafters propose. The popular role might also 
extend, perhaps more controversially, to a power to instruct those they elect as 
their convention delegates as to what the draft constitution should or should 
not contain.7 Finally, the recognition of this popular authority carries with it 
                                                                                                                     
 6 Madison’s proposal, which drew on a similar provision in the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights, read: “That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to 
reform or change their government, whenever it is found adverse or inadequate to the 
purposes of its institution.” Madison proposed that all the rights guarantees he was 
proposing be inserted into the body of the Constitution. Perhaps this provision, as well as 
the other declaration of principle that he sought to place at the beginning of the 
Constitution, were eliminated when the decision was made to append the bill of rights to 
the Constitution. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 11–14 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991). For Madison’s 
famed skepticism about frequent constitutional change, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James 
Madison). For Thomas Jefferson’s enthusiasm for periodic recurrence to the people for 
constitutional change, see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 
1816), in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 552, 559 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975). 
Jefferson wrote in the same letter:  
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them 
like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the 
preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond 
amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It was very like 
the present, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in 
government is worth a century of book-reading . . . . 
Id. at 558–59.  
 7 This might occur at either the federal or state level. At the Philadelphia Convention 
of 1787, for example, George Read of Delaware “remind[ed] the Committee that the 
deputies from Delaware were restrained by their commission from assenting to any change 
of the rule of suffrage, and in case such a change should be fixed on, it might become their 
duty to retire from the Convention.” JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 37 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1987) (1840). In 1776, three delegates to 
the Maryland Convention resigned because they could not adhere to the instructions of 
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the implication that other means of changing or revising constitutions, if they 
are not authorized or ratified by the people, are illegitimate. 
Before proceeding, a preliminary point deserves mention. This Article 
focuses on the popular role in constitutional creation, revision, and 
amendment, but the line between revision and amendment can be an uncertain 
one. When the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were added 
to the federal Constitution after the Civil War, did these amendments 
fundamentally change the government and political society, so that they 
should be seen as a revision of the document? Similarly, when the 
Pennsylvania convention of 1967–68 proposed numerous changes, including 
an entirely new judicial article, but retained substantial portions of the state’s 
1874 constitution, did it in doing so propose a new constitution? There are no 
easy answers to these questions. My rather mundane solution is to treat as 
amendments those changes that became part of a constitution by the 
amendment process prescribed by that constitution. 
III. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND  
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE FOUNDING PERIOD 
The initial constitution created for the United States, the Articles of 
Confederation, failed miserably, and its failure as a frame of government was 
matched by its failure in terms of popular constitutionalism.8 That the 
Continental Congress did not involve the citizenry in creating the Articles is 
perhaps understandable, given the dire military situation the country faced, 
although most states during the Revolutionary War did find it possible to enlist 
the people in the creation of their constitutions.9 Be that as it may, the Articles 
of Confederation was completed in 1777 by the Continental Congress, a body 
not specially elected for constitution-making, and became the operating 
constitution for the new Union even prior to formal ratification. Ratification 
required the consent of all thirteen states, but in most instances the approval of 
                                                                                                                     
their constituents. See MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE 
CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 76–81 (1997). Limiting the agenda 
of a constitutional convention, which has occurred frequently in the states, is another 
means of controlling what delegates discuss and propose.  
 8 Peter S. Onuf, The First Federal Constitution: The Articles of Confederation, in 
THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 82, 82 (Leonard W. Levy & 
Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987). 
 9 For example, the New York legislature that drafted the state’s constitution was 
almost constantly on the run from British forces—two members wryly suggested that it 
might be better “‘first to endeavor to secure a State to govern, before we established a form 
to govern it by’—and fear of invasion prompted the New Jersey legislature to frame and 
adopt a constitution in less than two weeks.” See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 63 (1998) [hereinafter TARR, UNDERSTANDING] (quoting WILLI PAUL 
ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLIC IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF 
THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 85–86 (Rita Kimber & Robert 
Kimber trans., Univ. of N.C. Press 1980) (1973)). 
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the states’ delegates in the Congress, who were not selected for this specific 
purpose, was deemed sufficient.10 Some states’ delegates were concerned that 
they lacked authority and delayed signing the Articles until they had received 
formal approval from their legislatures.11 
Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation required that constitutional 
amendments receive the unanimous approval of all thirteen state legislatures.12 
This proved an insuperable barrier to reform, so no amendments to the Articles 
were ever adopted.13 Yet by the time Maryland became the thirteenth state to 
sign the Articles in 1781, its deficiencies were already manifest—one 
commentator wryly described the Articles Congress as a mere “burlesque on 
government, and a most severe satire on the wisdom and sagacity of the 
people”—and efforts to correct its deficiencies had already commenced.14 
These efforts foundered, however, on the requirement of state unanimity. For 
example, Congress in 1781 submitted an amendment to the states to strengthen 
the fiscal powers of Congress, but Rhode Island blocked the effort by rejecting 
the amendment.15 This failure encouraged more radical steps. The delegates at 
the irregularly called Annapolis Convention of 1786, which met to deal with 
the commercial problems of the Confederation, unanimously petitioned 
Congress for a convention to explore possible remedies for the full panoply of 
defects of the Articles.16 Concerns about the deficiencies of state constitutions, 
about violations of those constitutions by state legislatures, and about the 
breakdown of order in the states, exemplified by Shay’s Rebellion, gave 
further impetus to these calls for reform.17 By February, 1787, after eight 
states had already appointed delegates to the Philadelphia convention, 
Congress somewhat reluctantly gave its blessing to the meeting, authorizing 
the convention to propose such amendments to the Articles as would render it 
“adequate to the exigencies of the union.”18 In doing so, it signed the death 
warrant for the Articles of Confederation.19 
Despite its “total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity,”20 the 
United States Constitution fares far better than the Articles in terms of popular 
constitutionalism. The delegates to the Philadelphia Convention were selected 
                                                                                                                     
 10 Onuf, supra note 8, at 82. 
 11 Id. at 82–83. 
 12 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII, para. 1. 
 13 Jack N. Rakove, The Road to Philadelphia, 1781–1787, in THE FRAMING AND 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 8, at 98, 99. 
 14 Onuf, supra note 8, at 83. 
 15 Rakove, supra note 13, at 102–03. 
 16 Id. at 108–10.  
 17 See generally CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: 
THE MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (2005). 
 18 Rakove, supra note 13, at 109. For a discussion of the political maneuverings 
leading up to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, see id. at 102–03. 
 19 Id. at 103–04. 
 20 THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 387 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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for the express purpose of constitutional reform by the people’s representatives 
in state legislatures.21 The document that the delegates drafted was submitted 
to conventions specially elected for the purpose, giving the people in the 
various states an indirect control over whether or not to ratify the Constitution; 
and even after ratification by the requisite nine states, the Constitution took 
effect only in those states that had ratified the document.22 The selection of 
delegates for the ratifying conventions was as democratic as the voting laws in 
the states allowed, which is to say quite democratic, as most states expanded 
suffrage as a result of the Revolution.23 Still, the vote for delegates to the 
ratifying conventions excluded women (with a limited exception in New 
Jersey), slaves, and free males who failed to meet state property requirements 
or other qualifications for voting.24 Some states, such as Connecticut and 
Massachusetts, recognizing the fundamental character of what was at stake, 
expanded the franchise to include property-less persons who were excluded 
from voting for the state legislature.25 Yet even in those states that did not 
expand their electorate for the occasion, those eligible to vote included more 
than sixty percent of adult white males.26 
More interesting are the implications of the Constitution’s creation and 
ratification for popular constitutionalism. It is an oft-told tale. The delegates to 
the Philadelphia Convention exceeded their congressional mandate, crafting an 
entirely new constitution rather than submitting amendments to the Articles of 
Confederation. They also departed from the Articles’ requirement of 
unanimous ratification, requiring the approval of only nine states for the 
Constitution to take effect; and they departed from the procedure specified in 
the Articles, providing that conventions rather than state legislatures ratify the 
changes they were proposing. Their actions raise two questions. Were the 
founders justified in undertaking what Bruce Ackerman has rightly labeled a 
“revolutionary redefinition of the rules of the game,” rules that had been 
adopted only a few years earlier by all thirteen states?27 And if the founders 
could legitimately ignore constitutionally prescribed procedures for 
                                                                                                                     
 21 The suspicious Rhode Island legislature refused to send any delegates to the 
convention. Christopher Klein, 7 Things You May Not Know About the Constitutional 
Convention, HISTORY.COM (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.history.com/news/7-things-you-
may-not-know-about-the-constitutional-convention [https://perma.cc/K2HE-AZFW]. 
 22 U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 23 For a discussion of the selection of delegates for the ratifying conventions, see 
generally ADAMS, supra note 9. 
 24 On the right of women property-owners to vote in New Jersey, see ROBERT F. 
WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION 11, 51 (updated ed. 1997).  
 25 On the legal qualifications for voting in the states during the late eighteenth 
century, see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 8–21 (2000). On the expansion of the electorate for 
choosing delegates to the Connecticut and Massachusetts conventions, see PAULINE MAIER, 
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 125–54 (2010). 
 26 See, e.g., KEYSSAR, supra note 25; MAIER, supra note 25.  
 27 ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 168. 
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constitutional change, did their example provide a precedent for future 
generations of constitutional reformers to do the same? 
The Federalists, those favoring the Constitution, sought to preclude that 
latter possibility, even as they defended their extraconstitutional actions. 
Responding to the charge of illegality—or at least extraconstitutionality—
James Madison in The Federalist No. 43 denied the authority of the Articles to 
bind the convention delegates.28 For one thing, “in many of the States [the 
Articles] had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification” 
and thus resembled a treaty more than a constitution.29 This was important, he 
maintained, because although the Articles mandated that it “shall be inviolably 
observed by every state,” in fact it had frequently been breached by the parties 
to this “treaty,” and under the principles of international law, breaches of a 
treaty absolve the parties of their obligations under it.30 This argument seems 
more clever than sound, particularly since the delegates met in Philadelphia 
under the authority of the Articles Congress. Madison also argued that the 
delegates had been faithful to their charge, which was to make such alterations 
of the Articles of Confederation as would “render the Constitution of the 
federal government adequate to the exigencies [of government and the 
preservation] of the Union.”31 The charge itself, he insisted, contained a 
contradiction in that there were no changes that could be made that would 
render the Articles adequate to the exigencies of government, and so the 
delegates reasonably chose accomplishment of the end over adherence to the 
means proposed by the Articles Congress.32 Yet the very term that we use for 
those who crafted the Constitution—“the Founders”—indicates our 
recognition that the delegates were not merely following the mandate of the 
Congress. 
Madison acknowledged that the convention did depart from its instructions 
in opting for ratification by nine states rather than thirteen, but he stressed that 
requiring unanimous ratification “would have subjected the essential interests 
of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single member.”33 Practical 
concerns also influenced other delegates at the Philadelphia Convention. They 
noted that a ratifying convention was a single body, whereas ratification by 
state legislatures would in most states require the approval of two bodies (both 
houses of bicameral legislatures), and that the state legislatures would lose 
power as a result of the new constitution and therefore would likely oppose 
it.34 But ultimately, Madison appealed to the “absolute necessity of the case; to 
the great principle of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of nature and 
of nature’s God, which declares that the safety and happiness of the society are 
                                                                                                                     
 28 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 29 Id. at 279. 
 30 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII, para. 1.  
 31 THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 32 Id.  
 33 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 28, at 279. 
 34 MADISON, supra note 7, at 70–71. 
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the objects at which all political institutions aim and to which all such 
institutions must be sacrificed.”35 Edmund Randolph advanced a similar 
argument at the Philadelphia convention. Responding to concerns about “a 
want of power”, he declared that he “was not scrupulous on the point of 
power. When the salvation of the Republic was at stake, it would be treason to 
our trust, not to propose what we found necessary.”36 Besides, the want of 
power was not crucial because the Convention was merely offering proposals, 
with the ultimate determination to be made by the people themselves. Thus, 
Madison concluded that the Constitution “is to be of no more consequence 
than the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation 
of those to whom it is addressed.”37 Ultimately, then, it was the will of the 
people that was determinative. 
This invocation of the authority of the people connects Madison’s 
arguments with Larry Kramer’s popular constitutionalism.38 Like Kramer, 
Madison and his colleagues endorse constitutional change occurring outside 
the parameters of what the existing government required for such change, and 
they do so in the name of the people, who have the ultimate authority to 
vindicate their actions.39 Like Kramer, they view this power of the people as 
decisive, even though the government created by the Articles had at least some 
claim to democratic legitimacy, given that the Articles were adopted by all the 
states only a few years earlier.40 However, unlike Kramer, they seek to cabin 
such extraconstitutional practices.41 Circumvention of constitutional forms 
was justified in 1787 only by the absolute necessity of the case, because “the 
salvation of the Republic was at stake.”42 But normal situations do not justify 
extraordinary remedies. Of course, that leaves unanswered the questions of 
who determines when an “absolute necessity” exists and on what bases.43 Thus 
later commentators, like Bruce Ackerman, have pointed to the irregularities at 
the Founding to justify irregularities at later stages in the nation’s 
constitutional development.44 
Madison’s endorsement of the extraordinary actions taken in Philadelphia 
is all the more striking when one recalls his adamant opposition to a second 
                                                                                                                     
 35 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 28, at 279. 
 36 MADISON, supra note 7, at 127. Even George Mason, who ultimately became an 
Anti-Federalist, concurred: “He thought with his colleague Mr. R[andolph] that there were 
besides certain crisises [sic], in which all the ordinary cautions yielded to public necessity.” 
Id. at 157.  
 37 THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 31, at 252. 
 38 See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 962–67 (2004) [hereinafter KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES]. 
 39 See generally MADISON, supra note 7. 
 40 See generally id. 
 41 See generally id. 
 42 Id. at 127. 
 43 See generally MADISON, supra note 7. 
 44 ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 37–44, 165–69. 
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constitutional convention, proposed by opponents of the Constitution as a way 
of “improving upon” the work of the Philadelphia Convention, and his more 
general reluctance to refer constitutional questions to the people.45 Even 
though he felt obliged to propose the Bill of Rights in the first Congress, his 
tepid support for amendments during the ratification period reflected real 
doubts about their utility, and his aim throughout the process was primarily to 
head off amendments that might cripple the new government.46 This is 
reflected in both what he took and what he did not take from the lists of 
amendments submitted by the state ratifying conventions. In particular, 
Madison omitted proposals that introduced structural changes or curtailed the 
powers of the federal government, and he successfully opposed amending the 
Constitution to limit the federal government to those powers “expressly” 
conferred upon it.47 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE UNDER ARTICLE V 
Article V specifies two methods of proposing amendments to the 
Constitution: proposal by a two-thirds majority in each house of Congress or 
proposal by a constitutional convention, to be called by Congress upon 
application by two-thirds of the state legislatures.48 In providing alternative 
modes of amendment, it prevents members of Congress from blocking needed 
reforms, even if those changes might affect congressional power. Article V 
also authorizes two methods of ratifying amendments: approval by the 
legislatures of three-quarters of the states or by specially elected conventions 
in three-quarters of the states, investing Congress with the power in each 
instance to choose between these two modes of ratification.49 In doing so, the 
Constitution repudiates the unanimity requirement of the Articles of 
Confederation, and it also allows Congress to bypass state legislatures if it is 
perceived that they might, for self-interested reasons, block needed reforms.50 
                                                                                                                     
 45 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 49, 50 (James Madison). 
 46 ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER: HOW JAMES MADISON USED 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE CONSTITUTION (1997). 
 47 See generally GOLDWIN, supra note 46, at 140–53. Madison did not believe that the 
Bill of Rights restricted federal power because federal actions invading those rights would 
have been ultra vires, beyond the powers conferred by the enumeration of powers. 
 48 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 49 Id. 
 50 The only time that Congress has designated that specially elected conventions be 
used was in the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, which repealed the Eighteenth 
Amendment and Prohibition. DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: 
AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995, at 282–87 (1996). Congress did so 
because the legislatures in many states were malapportioned to favor rural interests, and it 
was in rural areas that support for prohibition was strongest. Reliance on conventions 
promoted popular constitutionalism because most states included on the ballot whether 
delegates were pro- or anti-ratification (or some, uncommitted). See RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL 
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Madison describes these arrangements as striking the proper balance. “It 
guards equally against that extreme facility, which would render the 
Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate 
its discovered faults.”51 Later commentators have disputed that assessment, 
finding the Article V process exceedingly difficult.52 Finally, Article V 
imposes two limitations on the amendment power, prohibiting amendments 
prior to 1808 that would interfere with the slave trade and guaranteeing that no 
state can be deprived without its consent of its equal representation in the 
Senate.53 These limitations are now of only historical interest. 
Neither Article V nor any other part of the Constitution deals directly with 
constitutional revision. Such replacement of the Constitution could occur 
extraconstitutionally, relying on the people’s right to replace their 
governments recognized in the Declaration of Independence; or it could 
possibly occur through a constitutional convention called under Article V, 
although that provision only authorizes “call[ing] a Convention for proposing 
Amendments,” so the form of the Constitution would remain even though 
amendments had transformed the system of government. Some academics 
have championed fundamental reform, but despite periodic public 
disenchantment with the federal government, there has never been a 
significant popular movement favoring constitutional revision.54 
There have been few Article V amendments as well. If one excludes the 
first fifteen years under the new Constitution as a period for adding a Bill of 
Rights and remedying problems that became apparent immediately after 
ratification, there have been only fifteen amendments in more than two 
centuries, fewer than one every fourteen years.55 Most of these amendments 
                                                                                                                     
CONVENTION 126 (1988). Also, during the 1932 election, eleven states had referenda on 
whether to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment, all of which passed easily. As a result, 
conventions on repeal did not deliberate but merely voted—the New Hampshire 
convention, for example, lasted seventeen minutes. See KYVIG, supra, at 282, 286. 
 51 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 28, at 278.  
 52 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 159–66 (2006) 
[hereinafter LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION]. See generally Stephen M. 
Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to Practice, in RESPONDING 
TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford 
Levinson ed., 1995). 
 53 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 54 Id. Over the last half century, the leading academic proposals for constitutional 
revision have included JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY: 
FOUR-PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA (1963); LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 52; and JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND 
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (rev. ed. 1992). 
 55 The Eleventh Amendment was adopted to overturn Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 419 (1793), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Constitution permitted 
the resident of one state to sue the government of another state in federal court. The 
Twelfth Amendment was adopted to remedy the problem with the Electoral College that 
produced a tie vote in the election of 1800. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
69 (1996); Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and Its Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ. 
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were adopted at key divides in the nation’s history—three during 
Reconstruction, four during the Progressive Era, and four during the Great 
Society Era—and so for long stretches of American history, there were no 
additions to the Constitution.56 This relative infrequency contrasts sharply with 
the pattern in the states—state constitutions have been amended on average 
about 1.23 times per year, and amendment has been constant rather than 
episodic.57 It also contrasts with the pattern in other countries. In a study of 
amendment patterns in thirty countries, Donald Lutz found that the United 
States had the eighth lowest rate of amendment, and the ranking would be 
even lower if one eliminated the founding period from consideration.58 
What accounts for this infrequency of amendment? For one thing, one of 
the two modes of proposing amendments—the convention method—has faded 
into obsolescence: there has not been a federal convention since 1787.59 In 
part, this reflects procedural uncertainties that Madison himself recognized 
during the constitutional convention: how many delegates should there be, 
how should they be apportioned, and how should they be selected?60 These 
questions are answerable, but Congress has chosen not to answer them, 
thereby increasing the uncertainty over, and reducing the likelihood of, a 
convention. In part, the disappearance of the convention option reflects fears, 
real or manufactured, of what such a convention might produce, with dire 
warnings about runaway conventions and the repeal of fundamental rights. 
These fears are likely groundless, given the states’ success with constitutional 
conventions, but they have had an effect nonetheless.61 There is considerable 
irony here. The Virginia Plan proposed that a system of amendment be created 
that did not involve Congress, and the convention mode was the only one 
approved until late in the Philadelphia Convention.62 Not until the last week 
did the delegates authorize Congress to propose amendments, responding to 
                                                                                                                     
L. REV. 195, 197 (2004); Mark Strasser, Chisholm, The Eleventh Amendment, and 
Sovereign Immunity: On Alden’s Return to Confederation Principles, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 605, 606, 617 (2001).  
 56 See generally David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1458–90 (2001). 
 57 Donald S. Lutz, Patterns in the Amending of American State Constitutions, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND 
HISTORICAL PATTERNS 24, 34–35 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996) [hereinafter Lutz, Patterns].  
 58 Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION, supra note 52, at 237, 261 tbl.11 [hereinafter Lutz, Toward a Theory]. 
 59 Michael A. Almond, Comment, Amendment by Convention: Our Next 
Constitutional Crisis?, 53 N.C. L. REV. 491, 493 (1975). 
 60 MADISON, supra note 7, at 37–38.  
 61 Illustrative of the panicked reaction to the possibility of a constitutional convention 
is CAPLAN, supra note 50. For a valuable corrective, see generally PAUL J. WEBER & 
BARBARA A. PERRY, UNFOUNDED FEARS: MYTHS AND REALITIES OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION (1989). 
 62 Almond, supra note 59, at 497 n.26. 
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Alexander Hamilton’s contention that those in government would be better 
able to detect defects in the Constitution.63 
Another reason for the infrequency of federal constitutional amendments 
is the difficulty of the remaining mode of amendment: Lutz’s study concluded 
that it was the second most difficult amendment process in the thirty countries 
he studied.64 The difficulty lies less with the super-majority of state 
legislatures or conventions required for ratification than with the requirement 
of two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress.65 The states have failed to 
ratify only six amendments sent to them by Congress, but Congress has 
proposed only thirty-three amendments in 225 years.66 This might be viewed 
as vindicating the concern expressed in the Philadelphia Convention that 
Congress could too often frustrate the popular desire for amendments. There 
have been proposals periodically to amend Article V to facilitate constitutional 
amendment, but these efforts have attracted little support and enjoyed no 
success.67 
A final reason for the infrequency of amendment is the aura that surrounds 
the Constitution and those who created it. Madison argued in The Federalist 
No. 49 that “frequent appeals [to the people] would, in great measure, deprive 
the government of that veneration which time bestows on everything, and 
without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess 
the requisite stability.”68 Yet his argument may have succeeded all too well, 
insofar as later majorities have been intimidated from seeking to improve upon 
what they have inherited. This is important because an absence of formal 
amendment is not necessarily the same as an absence of constitutional change. 
It may be that constitutional change is occurring but that the change is through 
other mechanisms in which the people have less of a role, such as through 
judicial rulings or legislative or executive actions. The choice may not be 
between constitutional change and an unchanged Constitution but rather 
between constitutional change consistent with popular constitutionalism and 
constitutional change inconsistent with it. 
V. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ARTICLE V 
The stringent requirements of Article V promote popular constitutionalism 
insofar as they ensure that all constitutional amendments enjoy broad popular 
                                                                                                                     
 63 KYVIG, supra note 50, at ch. 3.  
 64 Lutz, Toward a Theory, supra note 58, at 260. 
 65 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 66 The amendments rejected in the states include the Congressional Apportionment 
Amendment, Titles of Nobility Amendment, Corwin Amendment, Child Labor 
Amendment, the Equal Rights Amendment, and the District of Columbia Statehood 
Amendment. See generally KYVIG, supra note 50. 
 67 JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789–1995, at 9–11 (1996).  
 68 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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support. This is reflected in the history of their adoption. The Bill of Rights 
was adopted because of widespread popular concern about the absence of 
rights guarantees in the proposed Constitution—indeed, the Constitution likely 
would have been defeated had the Federalists not promised to introduce 
amendments after its adoption.69 The Reconstruction Amendments emerged 
out of a savage war fought to secure “a new birth of freedom.”70 Some 
amendments originated in mass popular movements—for example, the 
Eighteenth Amendment (imposing Prohibition) and the Nineteenth 
Amendment (securing woman suffrage).71 Others reflected either a broad 
bipartisan reform consensus—for example, the Sixteenth Amendment 
(authorizing an income tax) and the Seventeenth Amendment (instituting 
popular election of senators)—or the views of a dominant political coalition—
for example, the Twenty-second Amendment (limiting presidents to two 
terms).72 Still others, while not originating in popular movements, nonetheless 
enjoyed broad support and were ratified within a year of their submission to 
state legislatures. These included the Eleventh Amendment (reversing a 
Supreme Court ruling that allowed citizens of one state to sue another state), 
the Twelfth Amendment (reforming the operation of the Electoral College), 
the Twenty-third Amendment (permitting residents of the District of Columbia 
to vote for presidential electors), and the Twenty-sixth Amendment (extending 
the right to vote to eighteen-year-olds).73 
Yet many significant constitutional changes have occurred outside Article 
V procedures. Any list of the most significant constitutional changes since the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights would include the expansion of presidential 
power, the expansion of national power more generally, the rise of the 
administrative state, the elimination of slavery, and invalidation of the system 
of racial subordination that it engendered. Of these changes, only the 
elimination of slavery occurred primarily through formal constitutional 
amendment, and even then it followed the Emancipation Proclamation and a 
bloody Civil War. Constitutional amendments have largely dealt with other 
issues. Since 1792, five have nationalized and expanded the franchise, four 
have dealt with the perennial issue of presidential selection and succession, 
five have served to overturn Supreme Court rulings, and two have involved a 
failed experiment with Prohibition.74 So although all federal constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
 69 See, e.g., GOLDWIN, supra note 46, at 140–53.  
 70 President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 734 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1969). 
 71 See ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 
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 72 See id. at 66–81, 113–24. 
 73 See id. at 18–30, 126–29, 141–46. On the politics surrounding the constitutional 
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 74 The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth 
amendments have expanded the franchise. The Twelfth, Twentieth, Twenty-Second, and 
Twenty-Fifth have addressed presidential election and succession. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
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amendments have involved popular constitutionalism, this does not mean that 
all major constitutional changes have. 
VI. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE OUTSIDE OF ARTICLE V? 
A. Akhil Amar 
In recent decades, two well-known scholars, Akhil Amar and Bruce 
Ackerman, have argued that the opportunities for popular constitutionalism 
under the federal Constitution are broader than they may initially appear, 
because Article V does not exhaust the means by which the people can amend 
the federal Constitution. For Amar, Article V elaborates the mechanisms by 
which those in government may amend the Constitution, but it “neither limits 
nor empowers the People themselves.”75 The people had the right to form, 
alter, or abolish governments prior to the adoption of the Constitution, and 
they did not forfeit this right when the Constitution was ratified.76 What does 
this non-exclusivity of Article V mean in practice? According to Amar, the 
people can call conventions without following Article V procedures, and 
through these conventions they can transition to a new constitution and 
government or can introduce changes in the existing constitution and 
government.77 In addition, they can, by majority vote in a referendum, approve 
or reject proposed amendments, thus circumventing both the modes of 
ratification specified in Article V and its federalism and extraordinary-
majority requirements.78 In doing so, Amar insists, the people would merely 
be emulating the example of the founders, who channeled “the theretofore 
supra-legal right of revolution into precise and peaceful legal procedures.”79 
As a statement of the right of the people outside the Constitution, Amar’s 
claim is unexceptionable: the Declaration of Independence recognizes that the 
                                                                                                                     
XI–XXVI. The Eleventh, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth 
amendments all overturned Supreme Court decisions. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
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CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 75 Akhil Reed Amar advances his theory in Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the 
Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1055 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, 
Philadelphia Revisited], and The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment 
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).  
 76 Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 75, at 1053. 
 77 Id. at 1045–60.  
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. (emphasis added). 
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people’s right to form and alter governments is inalienable.80 But Amar’s 
claim is that the right of the people to institute constitutional change outside 
Article V is not extraconstitutional but rather consistent with the 
Constitution.81 Underlying his position is a belief that fundamentally the 
Constitution is predicated on popular sovereignty.82 Whereas the extraordinary 
majorities required by Article V may serve as a check on the people’s 
representatives, who may be ignorant of or disdainful of the popular will, they 
are not required when the people act directly.83 Thus, ratification by a national 
majority in a referendum poses no problems in terms of federalism, because 
the aim of the Constitution was that “the cool and deliberate sense of the 
community” should prevail, rather than that sense be subordinated to claims of 
state sovereignty.84 In support, Amar points to the influential Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, where the declaration of the right of the people to alter 
or abolish their governments was followed by a provision locating that right in 
“a majority of the community.”85 Similarly, Amar contends that popular 
conventions called outside Article V are not problematic because they are 
consistent with other provisions of the Constitution.86 These include the 
Preamble, which recognizes the right of the people to form or abolish a 
constitution; the First Amendment, which arguably contemplated such 
conventions when it guaranteed “the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”; and the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments, which recognize “the people” do “retain” and “reserve” 
their “right” and “power” to exercise their popular sovereignty.87 
Amar’s effort to expand the opportunities for popular constitutionalism 
under the Constitution ultimately fails.88 The people may not have given up 
their extraconstitutional right to alter or abolish their government—the right to 
                                                                                                                     
 80 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“[G]overnments are 
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 81 See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 75, at 1054. 
 82 Id. at 1060. 
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 86 Id. at 1056–58. 
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 88 This paragraph relies primarily on David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We 
Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1–66 (1990); and chapter 6 of 
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revolution is inalienable—but in undertaking such change under the 
Constitution, they are bound by the Constitution they ratified. On its face, the 
language of Article V is exclusive and conclusive, whereas the provisions that 
Amar gathers in support of his thesis are very broad and do not speak directly 
about the amendment process.89 Furthermore, in the debates at the 
Philadelphia Convention and in the state ratifying conventions, there is no 
evidence that Article V was not viewed as setting out the exclusive means of 
amending the Constitution. The same holds true of The Federalist. Indeed, 
James Madison seems to anticipate and reject Amar’s argument, noting that 
“the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the people 
of the Union,” as Amar suggests, if the mode of amendment were simply 
national in character; but he then describes the amendment process as “neither 
wholly national nor wholly federal.”90 As George Washington put it in his 
Farewell Address in 1796: Although “the right of the people to make and alter 
their constitutions of government” is undoubted, constitutions were “sacredly 
obligatory” until changed “by an explicit and authentic act of the whole 
people” occurring through established channels for change.91 Until then, “[t]he 
very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish government 
presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the established 
government.”92 In the face of such evidence, it is difficult for a textualist or an 
originalist to expand the opportunities for popular constitutionalism beyond 
what Article V provides. 
B. Bruce Ackerman 
This does not pose a problem for Bruce Ackerman, who is neither a 
textualist nor an originalist.93 Article V may provide the mechanisms by which 
constitutional changes are usually adopted, but not all constitutional change 
has taken that form. In particular, Ackerman identifies three episodes94 in 
American history when major constitutional transformations occurred without 
constitutional formalities being observed. These include: (1) the Founding 
itself, when the Philadelphia Convention exceeded its mandate and 
restructured ratification procedures in order to revise the existing constitution; 
                                                                                                                     
 89 See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 75, at 1056–58. 
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(2) Reconstruction, when the Republican Congress after the election of 1866 
forced the Southern states to ratify the far-reaching Fourteenth Amendment as 
a condition for reclaiming their equal status in the Union; and (3) the New 
Deal era, when the landslide reelection of Franklin Roosevelt in 1936 and his 
threat to pack the Supreme Court prompted the Justices to cease their 
opposition to the President’s economic initiatives, and a series of appointments 
to the Court confirmed and solidified the new understanding of federal 
power.95 Ackerman’s narrative thus diverges from most historical accounts,96 
which grudgingly acknowledge the Founders’ irregularities but maintain that 
the Reconstruction Congress followed Article V in introducing its 
constitutional changes and that the New Deal conflict was resolved not by 
constitutional change but by the Supreme Court returning to the more 
generous—and, for most commentators, more appropriate—understanding of 
federal power pioneered by Chief Justice John Marshall. For Ackerman, the 
standard account unduly minimizes the discontinuities in the nation’s 
constitutional history, ignoring that “both Reconstruction Republicans and 
New Deal Democrats [were] engaging in self-conscious acts of constitutional 
creation that rivaled the Founding Federalists’ in their scope and depth.”97 In 
addition, it downplays the distinctive role played by the people in authorizing 
and approving these constitutional revisions.98 In both instances the new 
constitutional regimes that emerged were the product of  
interbranch struggle and popular mobilization [that] made the elections of 
1866 and 1936 decisive events in constitutional history. On both occasions, 
the reformers returned to Washington with a clear victory at the polls. They 
proceeded to proclaim that the election results gave them a “mandate from 
the People,” and that the time had come for the conservative branches to end 
their constitutional resistance.99  
Thus the alternative mode of constitutional amendment that Ackerman 
describes involves presentation of a clear constitutional choice by either 
Congress (as in 1866) or the President (as in 1936), intense popular 
mobilization over the issue in a political campaign, and a clear verdict from 
the people in a national election.100 
Ackerman’s revisionist account is not merely an attempt to correct the 
historical record. Rather, he views the actions of the Founders as establishing a 
precedent for “irregular” modes of constitutional change, legitimating the 
                                                                                                                     
 95 ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at ch. 3. 
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(1936); SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE FALLACIES OF STATES’ RIGHTS (2013). 
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creation of new constitutional regimes during Reconstruction and during the 
1930s and, presumably, at future points as well.101 For if the needs of the 
nation could justify ignoring constitutionally prescribed forms in 1787, they 
could likewise justify an evasion of Article V requirements or their state 
equivalents at later points in time. Madison, in The Federalist No. 49, cautions 
against multiplying appeals to the people, asserting that the conditions that 
promote successful constitution-making occur only infrequently.102 When 
such appeals take place, as he states in another paper, no change can occur 
“[u]ntil the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or 
changed the established form.”103 Nonetheless, “a constitutional road to the 
decision of the people ought to be marked out and kept open, for certain great 
and extraordinary occasions.”104 Ackerman asserts that on those occasions the 
people need not adhere to the “constitutional road” established by the 
fundamental law but may engage in higher law-making through other 
means.105 
In advancing this argument, Ackerman is at pains to distinguish between 
higher law-making and ordinary law-making and to insist that the gravity and 
consequences of higher law-making demand public-spirited deliberation.106 
He asserts that the modern system of constitutional change, pioneered in the 
New Deal crisis, meets that standard.107 Under this system the President 
claims a mandate based on his electoral success, Congress under the 
President’s leadership enacts transformative statutes that challenge the 
fundamentals of the existing constitutional regime, the Supreme Court 
invalidates those challenges to the constitutional order, and the issue of 
constitutional regime change is taken to the people in a critical election, where 
the mobilized people render their verdict at the polls.108 The public support for 
such regime change, Ackerman argues, must be deep, broad, and decisive; if it 
is, then the constitutional change that results is as legitimate as any changes 
pursued through Article V.109 
Historians and legal scholars have quarreled about whether the conditions 
Ackerman sets out were met in the election of 1936—David Dow, for 
example, dismisses “Ackerman’s theory [as] an example of bad history being 
                                                                                                                     
 101 As Ackerman notes, “[s]urely the American People have not yet pronounced the 
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used for questionable reasons”—and I shall not resolve that conflict here.110 
Let me instead highlight three aspects of Ackerman’s argument. First, the 
mode of constitutional change that Ackerman endorses differs dramatically 
from that outlined in Article V. Both the President and the Supreme Court play 
a role in Ackerman’s amendment process—indeed, the President may take the 
lead in defining constitutional issues and mobilizing public support—whereas 
they have no official role under Article V.111 The emphasis on federalism 
under Article V is replaced by an appeal to a national political majority under 
Ackerman’s version; the people play a direct role in constitutional change, as 
the critical election is seen as a referendum to decide between two 
constitutional visions, whereas the people play no direct role under Article 
V.112 Second, one can view Ackerman’s as a more popular version of 
constitutional change, enhancing opportunities for popular constitutionalism, 
yet it is easy to overstate how fundamental a change Ackerman is 
contemplating. He acknowledges that most constitutional change is not 
transformative and will continue to occur through the mechanisms established 
by Article V.113 He cites as an example the Twenty-sixth Amendment, which 
extended the right to vote to eighteen-year-olds, portraying it as a super-statute 
that had a narrow function and neither mobilized the public nor served as a 
prelude to further constitutional developments.114 Yet if the occasions for 
transformative constitutional change are rare, arising only two or three times 
since the Founding, then the opportunities for popular constitutionalism at the 
federal level remain circumscribed at best, even if one accepts Ackerman’s 
argument. Finally, one can accept Ackerman’s historical account of past 
departures from constitutional requirements without endorsing his claim that 
these justify future departures. What held for popular constitutionalism 
likewise holds for Ackerman as well: historical practice does not confer 
constitutional legitimacy.115 
VII. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
If the opportunities for popular constitutionalism in constitutional creation 
and re-creation are limited at the federal level, they are abundant in the states; 
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and the people in the various states have taken full advantage of them.116 The 
people play a direct role in the creation of their state constitutions, in almost 
all instances electing the convention delegates that draft the constitutions and 
ratifying or rejecting their work via popular referendum.117 The people in the 
states have also proved willing to engage in constitutional revision, having 
adopted 145 state constitutions, usually employing the same processes for 
revision as for the creation of their initial constitutions, and they have 
considered but rejected many more constitutions.118 More than one-third of 
state constitutions today date from the twentieth century.119 Finally, the people 
have devised multiple modes of amendment to facilitate the proposal of 
constitutional changes, and in forty-nine states (Delaware being the lone 
exception) they have provided for ratification by popular referendum.120 They 
have made extensive use of these processes of amendment, with more than 
10,000 amendments proposed to current state constitutions and more than 
6,500 adopted, an average of more than 120 amendments per state.121 The 
people in some states have been particularly active: for example, the 1901 
Alabama Constitution now has more than 580 amendments, and the 1982 
Georgia Constitution was amended during its first decade more times than the 
Federal Constitution has been during its entire history.122 From a different 
angle, the constitutional amendment rate per state is about 1.25 amendments 
per year, whereas the federal constitutional amendment rate is .13.123 Thus, if 
there is a complaint at the state level, it is not the difficulty but the ease of 
amendment. 
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VIII. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION AND POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The states have developed a thoroughly popular process for constitutional 
creation and constitutional revision.124 Typically the people vote on whether to 
hold a constitutional convention, they elect the delegates to that convention, 
and they vote on whether to ratify the convention’s handiwork.125 This process 
did not exist in the late eighteenth century, when the people in the states were 
devising their initial constitutions.126 Rather, it is the product of considered 
political choice and itself represents an important expression of popular 
constitutionalism whereby the people deliberately chose the procedure by 
which they would create and re-create their constitutions. Aside from the 
adoption of constitutions in the original thirteen states, the creation of state 
constitutions has generally been tied to the process of admission to the Union, 
with the drafting of constitutions and their submission to Congress being one 
of the steps in gaining admission.127 The hope of admission has influenced the 
deliberations and choices of the convention delegates.128 Article IV, Section 3 
of the U.S. Constitution, in “empowering Congress to admit new states to the 
Union, in effect, [gave] it the power to establish the conditions under which 
[states would] be admitted.”129 In the enabling acts by which it authorized 
prospective states to write constitutions and apply for statehood, Congress has 
imposed conditions on the substance of state constitutions, and state 
constitution-makers have had to meet those conditions in order to secure a 
favorable vote on admission.130 If the proposed constitution contained 
provisions of which Congress or the President disapproved, either branch 
could refuse to approve the legislation admitting the state until the offending 
provisions were removed or altered.131 For example, after Arizona proposed a 
constitution that included the recall of judges, President William Howard Taft 
vetoed the statehood bill, forcing Arizona to delete the provision; however, 
                                                                                                                     
 124 Although it is useful to separate the creation of state constitutions from their 
revision, there is some overlap, and this is reflected in the discussion in this section. See 
infra Part XII. 
 125 See WALTER F. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
21–25 (1910). When states revise their constitutions, the people may also determine in 
their authorization of the convention how comprehensive the revision is by taking certain 
subjects off the table or by requiring that they address certain issues, although they cannot 
dictate how the delegates shall resolve those issues. See infra Part XI. 
 126 DODD, supra note 125, at 21–25. 
 127 See TARR, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 9, at 39–41. 
 128 See id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 For a discussion on the requirements imposed as conditions for admission, see Eric 
Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on 
States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 120–29 (2004). 
 131 Id. 
258 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:2 
once admitted, Arizona immediately amended its constitution to reinstate 
recall of judges.132 
IX. THE POPULAR ROLE IN AUTHORIZING THE WRITING OF 
CONSTITUTIONS 
The people in the states began creating constitutions in 1776, with New 
Hampshire, South Carolina, and New Jersey drafting theirs even prior to 
independence.133 Given the novelty of the task and the pressures under which 
the states were operating, it is not surprising that procedures varied from state 
to state.134 However, a consensus quickly developed that the state legislature 
lacked the authority to create a constitution.135 In the words of a delegate to 
the Pennsylvania convention of 1776: “[L]egislative bodies of men have no 
more the power of suppressing the authority they sit by, than they have of 
creating it, otherwise every legislative body would have the power of 
suppressing a constitution at will.”136 In addition, there was concern that 
legislators might have “entrenched interests potentially subversive of the 
public good,” so a temporary body elected by the people, which would not 
benefit from what they wrote, was preferable.137 Early on, the states sought 
popular authorization by informing voters that they were choosing legislators 
who would likely vote on independence and, if called upon, would create a 
constitution.138 As the New Hampshire Constitution of 1776 noted in its 
preamble, those who framed it were “appointed by the free suffrages of the 
people . . . and authorized . . . to establish some form of government.”139 The 
Council of Safety in North Carolina resolved 
that it be recommended to the good people of this now Independent State of 
North Carolina to pay the greatest attention to the Election to be held on the 
fifteenth of October next . . . [as] it will be the business of the Delegates then 
                                                                                                                     
 132 TARR, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 9, at 41.  
 133 Id. at 61. 
 134 See id. at 60–67. 
 135 Historians disagree about whether any of the bodies that drafted the initial state 
constitutions were ordinary legislatures. Compare KRUMAN, supra note 7, at ch. 2, with 
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 138 See generally id. 
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chosen not only to make Laws for the good Government of, but also to form a 
Constitution for this State.140  
The people in some states also sought to instruct their representatives as to 
what the constitution should contain, asserting that legislators should act as the 
agents of the people rather than acting according to discretion once given 
authority by the people.141 When constituents in Maryland prepared 
instructions for their representatives, some representatives requested a meeting 
and, when they were unable to persuade their constituents to withdraw the 
instructions, those representatives resigned.142 In 1776, the Pennsylvania 
legislature pioneered an alternative approach, ordering copies of the proposed 
constitution be printed and distributed, while suspending legislative 
consideration of the constitution for eleven days so that the people had the 
opportunity to voice their views.143 Objections were raised to the short period 
for public debate, and these had an effect.144 When Pennsylvania revised its 
constitution in 1790, the convention adjourned from February to August to 
allow public consideration of its work prior to final adoption.145 
The means eventually chosen to enlist the people in constitutional creation 
was the constitutional convention, a body popularly elected for the sole 
purpose of drafting a constitution or proposing constitutional amendments. 
The convention was, as Gordon Wood has observed, “a totally new 
contribution to politics” that “institutionalized and legitimized revolution.”146 
By virtue of their special election, convention delegates were clothed with 
popular authority to undertake a specific task, and Pennsylvania even 
temporarily relaxed suffrage requirements so that the whole people could 
participate in this act of authorization.147 Since 1776 the states have held 233 
constitutional conventions, and even if a state constitution lacked provisions 
for constitutional amendment or revision, the state legislature was assumed to 
have the power to call conventions.148 On occasion there have been 
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irregularities. Voters approved conventions in New Hampshire in 1861 and 
1864, in Iowa in 1920, and in Maryland in 1950, but none were held; New 
York approved a convention in 1886 but delayed convening it until 1894.149 
The people in several prospective states also called conventions and wrote 
constitutions without congressional authorization—a form of state popular 
constitutionalism that anticipates Akhil Amar’s argument about the non-
exclusivity of Article V.150 However, when these extralegal conventions wrote 
state constitutions, it was understood that popular ratification and subsequent 
congressional approval rendered the defects of the process harmless.151 
Finally, on occasion state legislatures have declared themselves constitutional 
conventions and proposed constitutions for popular ratification. This occurred 
twice in the twentieth century, in Texas in 1974152 and in Louisiana in 
1992.153 In the former case the people authorized the legislature to act as a 
convention,154 but in the latter case Louisiana short-circuited both of the 
popular controls over constitution-making: the choice as to whether or not to 
call a convention and the popular selection of delegates for that purpose.155 In 
both Texas and Louisiana the people decisively rejected the proposed 
constitutions, and in Louisiana the governor apologized publicly for the 
circumvention of established procedures.156 
X. THE POPULAR ROLE IN APPROVING CONSTITUTIONS 
Many of the initial state constitutions were adopted without any thought of 
popular ratification, perhaps because of the novelty of the endeavor: after all, 
the creation of constitutions resembled the enactment of statutes, a process that 
did not require popular approval after the fact. However, some states did seek 
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to ensure popular input into constitutional deliberations through the instruction 
of delegates or by circulating the drafts of constitutions for popular comment 
before they were finalized.157 Georgia even provided for successive 
conventions to frame and revise its 1789 constitution, with a third convention 
elected to ratify it.158 In 1778 Massachusetts became the first state to seek 
popular ratification of a constitution, as the Massachusetts General Court 
(legislature) sent its proposed constitution to town meetings throughout the 
state.159 The people, however, rejected the document by a 9,972 to 2,083 
vote.160 In the wake of that decisive verdict, the General Court asked the town 
meetings whether they wanted the legislature or a specially elected convention 
to draw up the constitution, and when the town meetings chose the latter, a 
convention was called.161 Its handiwork was submitted to the town meetings in 
1780, and this time a constitution was adopted.162 
Even after Massachusetts pioneered popular ratification and New 
Hampshire emulated its example, the practice was slow to take hold. Most 
states outside New England did not have town meetings, and this complicated 
the task of consulting the people, although New Hampshire showed it was not 
impossible by submitting its 1792 constitution to a direct vote of the people.163 
Nonetheless, progress was slow and uneven: only one of the seven 
constitutions establishing new states in the Northwest Territory between 1801 
and 1830 was ratified by the people.164 During the 1830s, seven of ten 
conventions submitted their work for popular approval, and from 1840–1860 
all conventions did so.165 But most of the southern states that seceded did not 
submit their new constitutions for popular ratification, nor did six of the eleven 
southern states revising their constitutions after the conclusion of the Civil 
War.166 At the turn of the twentieth century, most southern states that were 
seeking to disenfranchise African-Americans and poor whites refused to 
submit their revised constitutions for ratification, presumably because they 
might be defeated.167 Indeed, Mississippi and South Carolina even failed to 
submit the convention call to popular approval, fearing that voters might block 
their disenfranchisement.168 These departures from the requirements of 
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popular constitutionalism underscore the importance of ratification for 
maintaining democratic rule. Altogether, of the 119 constitutions adopted 
between 1776 and 1900, forty-five of them (38%) took effect without popular 
ratification.169 It was only in the twentieth century that popular ratification 
became a standard feature of state constitutional creation and revision.170 
XI. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
Almost two centuries separate when New Hampshire created the first state 
constitution to when the fiftieth state, Hawaii, created its first constitution.171 
During this period the other forty-eight states adopted their first constitutions: 
fourteen in the eighteenth century, seventeen in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, fifteen in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and four during the 
twentieth century.172 During this same period thirty-one states revised their 
original constitutions, including fifteen in the twentieth century; and the 
majority of states have had three or more constitutions.173 The fact that 
constitutional creation and revision have occurred over such an extended 
period has affected the contents and design of those constitutions, because 
over time understandings of what a good state constitution should include have 
changed dramatically.174 The people in a state can decide whether their 
constitution should be a short framework document, as was typical in the late 
eighteenth century;175 a detailed instrument of government, as was typical in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century;176 or a more streamlined document, as 
was typical in the twentieth century.177 They can determine which subjects are 
appropriate to include in the constitution and which are not, and in particular 
they can decide whether or not to insert detailed policy prescriptions in their 
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documents.178 They can seek to reduce corruption and the power of special 
interests by imposing procedural restrictions designed to promote greater 
transparency, by restricting the use of special laws where general laws are 
possible, and by imposing restrictions on legislatures or by transferring their 
power elsewhere.179 They can decide whether to constitutionalize matters, 
withdrawing them altogether from legislative consideration, or they can grant 
broad discretion to the people’s representatives.180 They can decide whether to 
speak in general terms or in detailed prescriptions, thereby affecting the range 
of discretion available to legislators and other government officials.181 They 
can create opportunities for direct popular oversight and input through direct 
democracy, or they can rely on the system of representation to ensure 
accountability to the public.182 Thus the people do not merely have the 
authority to create and re-create state constitutions, but also to create quite 
different charters and quite different systems of government.183 
The people’s power to frame state constitutions also enables them to 
influence constitutional interpretation. The people can frame state provisions 
with specificity to reduce the need for interpretation—for example, several 
states during the latter half of the nineteenth century added provisions 
expressly prohibiting aid to religious institutions and/or religious schools.184 
The people can also insert provisions to overturn disfavored judicial 
interpretations, as California and Massachusetts did in reinstating the death 
penalty.185 In addition, they can change their constitutions to preclude 
disfavored judicial interpretations—consider the proliferation of state 
provisions defining marriage in the wake of Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health.186 The people can include provisions directing how courts 
should interpret the constitution, as Florida did when it required the state’s 
courts to interpret the state ban on unreasonable search or seizure no more 
broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment.187 
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Finally, the more recent the constitution is adopted by the people, the more 
likely they are to have anticipated current problems and dealt with them in the 
constitutional text. The availability of directly pertinent constitutional 
language means that there is less need for creative judicial interpretation to 
apply constitutional principles to contemporary concerns. 
XII. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION AND POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Initially, state constitutional revision and the right to revolution were 
intertwined in constitutional thought. Thus, Christian Fritz observes that “as 
Americans included it in their constitutions, the right of revolution came to be 
seen as a constitutional principle permitting the people as the sovereign to 
control government and revise their constitutions without limit.”188 The 
popular role in both revision and revolution was expressly recognized in state 
constitutions. By 1850, more than eighty percent of state constitutions 
acknowledged that “political society is derived from the people and 
established with their consent,”189 and more than half expressly stated that 
“the people . . . have the inherent, sole, and exclusive right of regulating the 
internal government . . . and of altering and abolishing their constitution and 
form of government whenever it may be necessary to their safety and 
happiness.”190 Yet over time constitutional revision became understood as the 
more capacious notion, because revolution was justified only by governmental 
oppression, whereas revision was justified whenever the people concluded that 
constitutional change would improve their situation.191 Indeed, recourse to the 
people through constitutional revision became a key feature of state politics in 
the nineteenth century.192 In part, these appeals to the people were backward-
looking, based on the belief that a frequent recurrence to first principles would 
encourage popular attachment to the constitution and ensure constitutional 
fidelity.193 But in part they were forward-looking, based on the premise of 
progress in constitutional thinking and on the need to adapt the basic law to 
changing circumstances and attitudes.194 As Thomas Jefferson put it: “We 
might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, 
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as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous 
ancestors.”195 
The most common procedure for state constitutional revision involves the 
people’s representatives in the legislature referring to the people the question 
of whether to call a convention. In some states the legislature can propose a 
convention by a simple majority vote196; in others, the requirement is two-
thirds.197 Whichever the procedure, if the people concur, they then elect 
convention delegates; and if it is to be a limited convention, they may place 
restrictions on the matters that the delegates can address.198 Ultimately the 
people approve or reject the delegates’ proposal or proposals.199 
Forty-one states specify the procedure for calling conventions in their 
constitutions, and in the remaining states it is understood that legislatures 
possess that power as part of their plenary legislative power.200 Within this 
framework there is considerable interstate variation. In authorizing a 
convention, two states—Illinois and Nebraska—require a three-fifths vote in 
the legislature for a popular referendum on calling a convention, and South 
Dakota likewise requires a three-quarters vote but dispenses with the 
referendum.201 Twenty states require a two-thirds legislative vote, and in five 
of these no popular vote is required, while sixteen states require only a 
majority vote in the legislature for a popular referendum on a convention.202 
As to the popular vote for a convention, in those states that require such a vote, 
twenty-one require a majority of those voting on the question, with Kentucky 
and Nebraska also specifying a minimum turnout.203 But some states require 
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more than a simple majority. For example, Illinois requires that three-fifths of 
those voting on the question approve a convention.204 Ten states require a 
positive vote by a majority of those voting in the election, so ballot fatigue can 
affect the outcome: in Michigan, for example, the people voted 
overwhelmingly for a convention in 1898 and 1904, but the majority was of 
those voting on the question, not of those voting at the election.205 Finally, in 
order to ratify the convention’s work, twenty-one states require a simple 
majority on the question or questions, but Minnesota demands a three-fifths 
positive vote, and New Hampshire two-thirds.206 Colorado requires a majority 
of those voting in the election, and Hawaii too imposes a turnout 
requirement.207 
The states have also developed mechanisms for calling conventions 
whereby the people can circumvent the state legislature if it is unwilling to 
act.208 In its 1776 constitution Pennsylvania created the Council of Censors, an 
elected body similar to a grand jury, which met every seven years to determine 
whether the constitution was being violated and could either propose 
amendments or call a constitutional convention.209 Vermont copied 
Pennsylvania’s effort to “institutionalize and routinize constitutional 
reassessment,”210 and although the Council of Censors failed in Pennsylvania 
and was eliminated in the 1790211 constitution, it continued to operate with 
some success in Vermont until 1869.212 In several states the people have 
proven to be good Jeffersonians, placing in their constitutions the requirement 
that the people be consulted to vote at regular intervals on whether to call a 
convention.213 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 pioneered the practice, 
providing for a popular vote in 1795, and the New Hampshire Constitution of 
1784 required that the convention question be submitted to voters every seven 
years. (In New Hampshire, this was vitally important, because the constitution 
did not authorize any other mode of constitutional change). Today, fourteen 
states provide for a periodic vote on whether to call a convention, with eight 
states posing the question every twenty years, four every ten years, Michigan 
every sixteen years, and Hawaii every nine years.214 Florida, Montana, and 
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South Dakota allow the people to call constitutional conventions via the 
initiative, though so far none has been convened through that procedure.215 
Although the people in the states have taken advantage of these 
opportunities to call conventions and revise their constitutions or to reject 
proposed revisions, the level of this activity has varied over time. The 
nineteenth century saw a great deal of constitutional revision, but during the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, only twelve states have revised their 
constitutions, although five states did adopt their first—and only—
constitutions. During the nineteenth century, states held 144 constitutional 
conventions, but since then only sixty-four.216 During the twentieth century, 
the period of greatest activity was from 1963–1976, when seven states adopted 
new constitutions in the wake of the Supreme Court’s reapportionment rulings 
and voters rejected six constitutions proposed by conventions and three others 
submitted by state legislatures.217 Since 1970, the outcome of votes on 
automatic convention calls has been positive only four times.218 In part, these 
negative votes may reflect a popular distrust of constitutional revision, which 
is increasingly seen as dominated by the same political elites and special 
interests that dominate ordinary politics.219 In part, however, the rejection of 
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conventions may reflect a popular preference for piecemeal rather than 
comprehensive reform, as the decline in constitutional revision has been 
accompanied by an increase in state constitutional amendment, in which the 
people likewise play the key role. Whatever the cause, no state has revised its 
constitution in more than a quarter century. 
If the people have the power to revise constitutions, can they emulate the 
Philadelphia Convention by ignoring established procedures in the process? 
Christian Fritz has nicely framed the issue:  
The people’s sovereignty justified constitutional change when constitutions 
(state or federal) were silent about the means for revision or when it seemed 
appropriate to bypass existing procedures. More controversial was the notion 
that such change could occur independent of the existing government, in 
particular without the permission of the legislature.220  
The prime example of this was the so-called Dorr Rebellion in Rhode 
Island.221 Sixty-five years after independence, Rhode Island continued to be 
governed under the charter of 1663, with popular agitation for constitutional 
change stymied by an intransigent legislature and a severely restricted 
franchise.222 In response, in 1841, an extralegal People’s Convention was 
called, with delegates selected by an expanded electorate.223 The convention 
prepared a draft constitution, and then adjourned in October to allow for 
popular comment.224 It reconvened in mid-November to finalize the 
constitution, and in December 1841, nearly 14,000 people ratified the People’s 
Constitution.225 In 1842, elections were held under the People’s Constitution, 
and Thomas Dorr was elected governor.226 These developments led the 
legislature to call a Landholders’ Convention, which completed a new 
constitution in early 1842.227 However, the document, which made some 
concessions to the Dorrites, was rejected in a close vote.228 An election was 
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then held under the old constitution, resulting in two state governments 
competing for authority.229  
The state legislature under the old constitution called for another 
constitutional convention, which in 1843 proposed a revised constitution that 
offered concessions to the opponents of the 1663 charter.230 This constitution 
was ratified, although many of Dorr’s supporters boycotted the vote, so that it 
received less than half the votes that the People’s Constitution had.231 Dorr 
was imprisoned for his part in the attempted overthrow of the charter, and in 
Luther v. Borden,232 his attempt to gain vindication before the U.S. Supreme 
Court failed. His compatriots may have lost the battle, but they did win the 
war, as the Rhode Island General Assembly would not have called the 1843 
convention nor offered concessions on apportionment and the franchise absent 
the Dorr Rebellion.233 
Yet the Rhode Island example stands out precisely because it is so 
atypical. The Dorrites had to circumvent the malapportioned and 
unrepresentative legislature because its members controlled the legal path to 
constitutional reform and refused to call a convention that might divest them 
of their privileges. But in no other state did the people attempt to circumvent 
malapportioned state legislatures, even when population shifts made the 
overrepresentation of rural interests particularly egregious, perhaps because 
state constitutions provided other means for seeking constitutional change or 
because extralegal efforts seemed futile or inappropriate in a mature political 
society. Whatever the explanation, the Supreme Court’s “one person, one 
vote” rulings have removed the obstacle of unrepresentative legislatures, and 
the proliferation of constitutionally prescribed opportunities for popular 
constitutionalism makes resorting to extralegal means unnecessary 
XIII. THE PROPOSAL OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Only eight of the initial state constitutions specified procedures for 
amendment.234 The Delaware and New Jersey constitutions declared certain 
key provisions altogether immune from alteration.235 Several early nineteenth-
century state constitutions likewise did not expressly provide for amendment, 
perhaps assuming that the legislature had the inherent power to call 
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conventions.236 In some instances, the failure to include amendment provisions 
proved controversial: at a town meeting in Lexington, one person objected to 
the absence of an amendment provision in the proposed 1778 Massachusetts 
constitution, insisting it was necessary to “give satisfaction to the people; and 
be a happy means, under providence, of preventing popular commotions, 
mobs, bloodshed, and civil war.”237  
Of those early constitutions that addressed the subject, some made 
constitutional change exceedingly difficult. For example, the Delaware 
Constitution of 1776 permitted amendments only with the concurrence of five-
sevenths of the lower house of the legislature and seven-ninths of the 
legislative council. The Maryland Constitution of 1776 required that 
amendments twice receive a two-thirds vote in the legislature, with an election 
intervening.238 But over time the processes of constitutional amendment 
changed to make it easier for the people to amend their constitutions by 
simplifying the procedures for amendment, by adding further modes of 
amendment, and by reducing the percentage of voters necessary to ratify 
amendments. 
Initially, several states concluded that the same objections that applied to 
legislatures writing constitutions applied to their amending constitutions, and 
so the constitutions of Pennsylvania (1776), Vermont (1777), Georgia (1777), 
Massachusetts (1780), and New Hampshire (1784) expressly prohibited 
legislative amendment, relying instead on constitutional conventions.239 
Indeed, in New Hampshire the constitutional convention remained the only 
mechanism for proposing amendments until 1964. But with the development 
of popular ratification this objection lost much of its force, and over time 
roughly ninety percent of state constitutional amendments have been proposed 
through state legislatures.240  
Many states initially required passage of proposed amendments in two 
successive legislative sessions with an intervening election, so that the people 
could by their votes express their views on proposed amendments, and fifteen 
states retain some form of that requirement today.241 Although the two-session 
requirement does give the people a chance to render a verdict by unseating 
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legislators, it also slows the effort to address pressing problems, particularly in 
states whose legislature only meets biennially. The remaining thirty-five 
states, confident that popular ratification ensures sufficient popular control, 
have dispensed with dual passage.242 Yet considerable variation remains, as 
states may authorize proposing amendments by a supermajority in two 
legislative sessions, by supermajority in a single session, by a simple majority 
in two sessions, or by a simple majority in a single session.243 In fact, four 
states—Connecticut, Hawaii, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania—have combined 
the alternatives, permitting proposal by simple majorities in two sessions or by 
an extraordinary majority in a single session.244 
Most state constitutions also provide modes of amendment that do not 
require legislative approval, lest the people be stymied by legislators’ hostility 
to changes that might adversely affect them. The earliest of these was the 
constitutional convention, which could be used for amendment, as well as for 
revision; most states permit limited, as well as unlimited, conventions. This 
only partially solved the problem, however, because a legislature that was 
adverse to proposing needed amendments might also resist calling a 
convention, particularly when the convention could be expected to remedy 
malapportionment resulting from population growth and population shifts in 
the state. Georgia sought to address the problem by obliging the legislature to 
call a convention if petitioned to do so by a majority of state’s citizens in a 
majority of its counties.245 Nonetheless, the costs of conventions and the 
intransigence of legislators prompted a search for other alternatives. 
During the twentieth century, states multiplied modes of proposal and 
eased requirements for proposal and ratification, thereby facilitating 
constitutional amendment. The first reform was the constitutional initiative, 
now in use in eighteen states, which allows proposed amendments to be placed 
on the ballot without legislative approval.246 The people are central throughout 
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the process of proposal and ratification. Individuals or groups within the 
populace decide what measures to propose, the people by signing or refusing 
to sign petitions determine whether proposals appear on the ballot, and at 
election the people determine whether the measures appearing on the ballot 
should be ratified. The constitutional initiative was initially adopted by Oregon 
in 1902, and twelve other states also adopted it during the Progressive Era.247 
Four more states adopted the constitutional initiative during the wave of 
constitution-making that followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s “one person, one 
vote” rulings,248 and in 1992, Mississippi adopted the constitutional initiative 
for a second time, seventy years after its supreme court had struck down its 
initiative as unconstitutional.249 From 2008–2014, seventy-eight constitutional 
initiatives appeared on the ballot, and thirty-four of them were approved. 
Nonetheless, most amendments are proposed by state legislatures—during the 
same period, legislatures proposed 522 amendments, and these amendments 
enjoyed a far higher rate of success (382 ratified).250  
Finally, in adopting its 1968 constitution, Florida provided for the 
convening in ten years and every twenty years thereafter of a Constitutional 
Revision Commission, which has the power to place proposals for amendment 
on the ballot without prior legislative scrutiny.251 This thirty-seven-member 
commission—fifteen appointed by the governor, nine each by the house 
speaker and the senate president, and three by the chief justice of the supreme 
court—was authorized to address all constitutional issues and to propose 
constitutional changes directly to the people.252 In 1998, Florida extended this 
model, creating by amendment a Taxation and Budget Reform Commission, 
which met in 2008 and meets every twenty years thereafter.253 This 
commission, all of whose twenty-nine members are appointed by the governor, 
the speaker of the house, or the president of the senate, likewise is authorized 
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to submit directly to the people amendments dealing with fiscal matters and 
budgetary processes.254  
On initial inspection, the Florida commissions may appear to attenuate the 
role of the people in constitutional change, because the people play no direct 
role in choosing their members or crafting the proposals that are submitted for 
ratification.255 Yet the adoption of these mechanisms for proposing 
amendments hardly signaled a rejection of popular constitutionalism. In 
addition to authorizing the two commissions to propose amendments, Florida 
continues to provide for proposal of amendments by the legislature, by 
constitutional initiative (added at the same time the Constitutional 
Commission was), and by constitutional convention. Moreover, the 
commissions have learned to consult public opinion in undertaking their 
deliberations. After all proposals were rejected in 1978, the Constitutional 
Revision Commission in 1998 supplemented its regular meetings with public 
hearings throughout the state to ensure that public opinion was reflected in 
their proposals.256 Perhaps as a result, eight of its nine proposals were ratified 
by the voters.257 
The proliferation of mechanisms for proposing amendments and the easing 
of requirements for proposing them has promoted a dramatic expansion of 
state constitutional amendment during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
(Other factors as well have contributed to the decline of revision and the rise 
of amendment.)258 Still, as noted, about ninety percent of state constitutional 
amendments are proposed by state legislatures.259 Moreover, legislatively 
proposed amendments enjoy a considerably higher success rate than those 
proposed by other means, such as the constitutional initiative. Let us turn now 
to the ratification process for state constitutional amendments. 
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XIV. THE RATIFICATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The Connecticut Constitution of 1818 was the first state constitution to 
provide for popular ratification of amendments. Today, forty-nine states 
provide for popular ratification of state constitutional amendments, with the 
majority required for ratification regardless of how the amendment is 
proposed.260 Forty-three states require ratification by a majority of those 
voting on the amendment, with Nevada requiring that voters approve 
amendments in two separate elections before they take effect.261 However, 
some states make ratification more difficult. A few states impose a turnout 
requirement, similar to the requirement for a quorum in legislative sessions. 
For example, Hawaii requires that those voting on the amendment include 
either a majority of those voting in the general election or the equivalent of 
thirty percent of those registered if a special election is used,262 while 
Nebraska requires that the majority for the amendment also exceed thirty-five 
percent of those voting in the election.263 Minnesota264 and Wyoming265 
require passage by a majority of those voting in the election. Tennessee 
requires that the vote take place at a general election in which the governor is 
to be elected, with passage of the amendment requiring a majority of those 
voting in the gubernatorial election.266 Two states require passage by super-
majorities: New Hampshire, a two-thirds vote,267 and Illinois, either a majority 
of those voting in the election or three-fifths of those voting on the question.268 
Finally, New Mexico requires higher popular majorities to amend provisions 
on the franchise or education, than to pass other amendments.269 
In some instances when ratification requirements have proved too 
burdensome, political forces sought to circumvent the requirements. At the 
dawn of the twentieth century, when ratification of amendments required a 
majority of those voting in the election, raising the possibility of defeat by 
ballot roll-off, political parties in Ohio made approval of amendments part of 
the party ballot, so that those voting a straight-party ticket would be counted as 
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voting for ratification.270 And in Illinois, constitutional reform forces, after 
many failed attempts, were able to adopt a “Gateway Amendment” that made 
it easier to amend the state constitution.271 But for the most part, the easing of 
ratification requirements to facilitate amendment has occurred through normal 
constitutional channels. Thus, during the nineteenth century, constitutional 
conventions eased requirements in order to permit constitutional change in 
response to shifts in population within their states, and in the twentieth 
century, they did so to overcome entrenched interests and facilitate enactment 
of popular measures. So whereas at the outset of the twentieth century, two 
states required a supermajority for ratification and eleven required a majority 
of those voting in the election, by its conclusion only one state required a 
supermajority of voters to approve amendments, and only five required 
approval by a majority of voters in the election.272  
XV. STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM AS POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The state experience with constitutional change displays a commitment to 
popular constitutionalism, reflected in institutions that give the people a direct 
role in constitutional creation and change, and in constitutional reforms 
designed to empower current popular majorities. Of course, not all the reforms 
enhanced the popular role in constitutional amendment—the people’s votes 
were determinative even before several were enacted—but they did tend to 
make it easier for a numerical majority of the people to work its constitutional 
will. Opponents sometimes objected that this easing of the requirements for 
amendment made their state constitutions not merely “flexible but absolutely 
wobbly” and worried that they “open[ed] the door to a pure and absolute 
democracy.”273 But these objections were generally unavailing, because most 
states had constitutionally committed themselves to popular constitutionalism. 
Illustrative of the provisions reflecting this is Section 2 of the New Jersey Bill 
of Rights, found in both the state’s 1844 and 1947 constitutions: “All political 
power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for the protection, 
security, and benefit of the people, and they have the right at all times to alter 
or reform the same, whenever the public good may require it.”274 So insofar as 
efforts to facilitate constitutional change excited opposition, that opposition 
was based less on principled objections to popular constitutionalism than on an 
obdurate desire to hold onto partisan or regional advantages safeguarded by 
existing arrangements.  
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XVI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
In The Federalist No. 43, James Madison contended that Article V struck 
the proper balance between “that extreme facility, which would render the 
Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate 
its discovered faults[;]”275 and certainly the Federal Constitution is easier to 
amend than its predecessor. But with a few notable exceptions, such as the two 
decades following ratification, Reconstruction, and the Progressive Era, formal 
constitutional change has proven difficult. One might attribute the infrequency 
of amendment to the wisdom of the Constitution’s drafters, and there is 
doubtless some truth to that, although the Founders themselves hardly viewed 
the Constitution as perfect.276 But it is more likely that the infrequency of 
amendment is not a reliable indicator of constitutional change. Such change 
has occurred, but it has occurred outside the channels prescribed in Article V: 
through political practice, constitutional construction, and creative judicial 
interpretation.277  
Indeed, one commentator has suggested that “[i]n its initial commitment to 
a written constitution and some version of rule-of-law constitutionalism at the 
national level and its later turn to complete reliance on non-Article V means to 
cope with significant constitutional change, the United States is unique.”278 
Insofar as this is the case, it raises legitimacy questions, and these have been 
endlessly debated. But for our purposes, the reliance on constitutional change 
outside Article V is important because of the questions it raises about whether 
the people’s authority over their Constitution has become attenuated. This 
requires an examination of how—and to what extent—the people continue to 
participate in constitutional change, constitutional interpretation, and defense 
of the Constitution against misinterpretation or unwanted change. Indeed, one 
may view the debate over advocates of popular constitutionalism and 
proponents of judicial supremacy—what Larry Kramer characterized as the 
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key conflict—as fundamentally a dispute over who will control non-Article V 
constitutional change.279 
Looking at state constitutions, one encounters a vastly different situation. 
As Alexander Hamilton reassured his readers in The Federalist No. 21, the 
Federal Constitution “could be no impediment to reforms of State 
Constitutions by a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode. That 
right would remain undiminished. The guaranty could only operate against 
changes to be effected by violence.”280 As this Article has shown, state 
popular majorities have accepted Hamilton’s implicit invitation. The number 
of state constitutions testifies to the people’s involvement in constitutional 
creation and revision, and the frequency of amendment shows that the people 
continue to participate in constitutional change even after the taste for revision 
has abated. This is not to say that political practice, constitutional construction, 
and creative judicial interpretation do not also produce state constitutional 
change. One can, for example, view the “new judicial federalism” as an 
attempt to introduce at the state level the sort of interpretive creativity 
pioneered by the U.S. Supreme Court.281 In addition, interstate differences in 
the frequency of state constitutional amendment and revision suggest that the 
balance between formal and informal change has varied from state to state and 
from era to era.  
Despite these caveats, one can identify two distinct constitutional 
traditions in the United States. The federal constitutional experience is rooted 
in a Madisonian skepticism about constitutional change and about recurrence 
to the people to resolve constitutional disputes.282 On occasion, as Bruce 
Ackerman has shown, constitutional crises have encouraged popular 
involvement in resolving constitutional conflicts, acting outside Article V.283 
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But most constitutional change nationally has occurred with little direct 
popular participation. This is not to say that federal constitutional change has 
ignored popular views. Barry Friedman, among others, has argued that: 
Ultimately, it is the people (and the people alone) who must decide what the 
Constitution means. Judicial review provides a catalyst and method for them 
to do so. Over time, through a dialogue with the justices, the Constitution 
comes to reflect the considered judgment of the American people regarding 
their most fundamental values. It frequently is the case that when judges rely 
on the Constitution to invalidate the actions of the other branches of 
government, they are enforcing the will of the American people.284  
Nonetheless, there is a fundamental difference between “constitutional 
doctrine tend[ing] to track public opinion”285 on high-salience issues on which 
the people have strong views, even if one assumes that the influence of the 
people on the Court is unidirectional, and ensuring, in Kramer’s words, that 
“the people retain authority in the day-to-day administration of fundamental 
law.”286 How to do this remains an issue for popular constitutionalists. Kramer 
admits that “[m]obs were fine in their context and in their time, but no one, 
least of all me, is suggesting that this is a good way to go about doing things 
today.”287 Rather, he describes his “goal” as “restor[ing] a true departmental 
system” as proposed by Madison and Jefferson.288 But this solution is itself 
problematic—as Saikrishna Prakash and John Yoo have observed: 
“Departmentalism, whatever its merits, cannot have grand populist 
pretensions, for it says absolutely nothing about the people’s constitutional 
role.”289 Nonetheless, Kramer’s embrace of departmentalism acknowledges 
that if popular constitutionalism is to be more than episodic at the federal 
level, there must be institutions through which the people can act. 
The state constitutional experience, in contrast, reveals a Jeffersonian 
openness to constitutional change and a commitment to frequent recurrence to 
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the people, actively involving them in constitutional creation, revision, and 
amendment. To facilitate this, the states have developed institutions through 
which the people can regularly act, and where obstacles have arisen limiting 
popular involvement in constitutional matters, the states have modified their 
institutions to facilitate such involvement. As a result, whereas popular 
constitutionalism at the federal level is episodic, popular constitutionalism in 
the states is ongoing, and this gives a distinctive character to state popular 
constitutionalism.290 
To understand this, consider once again how two of its leading advocates 
have portrayed popular constitutionalism at the federal level. Bruce Ackerman 
depicts popular constitutionalism as involving a mobilized populace acting 
when questions of fundamental constitutional import arise—thus “rarely, and 
under special constitutional conditions”—distinguishing sharply between such 
“higher lawmaking” and the ordinary politics of governmental action.291 Larry 
Kramer too describes a normally quiescent populace that is roused to action by 
constitutional crises or by controversial governmental actions, such as the 
Alien and Sedition Acts, that threaten constitutional values.292 Underlying 
both these portrayals is an understanding of constitutions as fundamental law, 
establishing a political framework and declaring matters of political principle 
rather than detailing the specifics of public policy. In short, constitutional 
politics—including popular constitutionalism—is differentiated from normal 
politics.  
But few state constitutions fit that description. They do, of course, 
establish the institutions of state government and proclaim fundamental 
principles, but they likewise include detailed policy prescriptions and 
numerous restrictions, both substantive and procedural, on the exercise of state 
power.293 In part, this reflects the legal character of state constitutions: because 
state legislative power is plenary, constitution-makers have had to specify the 
limits imposed on that power, and they have done so in great detail. In part, 
this reflects political choice: distrust of state legislatures has led the people in 
the various states to constitutionalize matters rather than leave them to 
legislative discretion.294 In part, the availability of mechanisms for 
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constitutional change that do not involve the state legislature—ranging from 
constitutional conventions to the constitutional initiative to Florida’s 
commissions—has provided ready means for constitutionalizing policy 
choices. The fact that in most states it is not much harder to qualify 
constitutional initiatives for the ballot than to do so with statutory initiatives 
encourages initiative sponsors to choose the constitutional route, regardless of 
the narrowness of the policy being adopted.295 In sum, state constitutions are 
not merely frameworks of government but also instruments of governance, and 
so state constitutional politics is not decisively different from ordinary state 
politics. 
This in turn affects the operation of popular constitutionalism in the states. 
The number and frequency of proposed amendments means that most do not 
achieve the salience or generate the sustained public debate that Ackerman 
contemplates for dualist democracy. For the most part, popular 
constitutionalism in the states is a continuation rather than an alternative to 
ordinary politics. Is that enough? 
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